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DIVERSITY- JURISDICTION UNDER THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSALS:
ITS PURPOSE AND ITS EFFECT ON
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
QUENTIN N. BURDICK*
This article has a twofold purpose: to outline the proposed
changes in diversity jurisdiction recommended by the American Law
Institute as well as the rationale advanced for these changes; and to
evaluate the effect of the proposed changes on the state and federal
courts.
THE ORIGIN OF THE ALI STUDY
On May 11, 1971, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery, I introduced S. 1876, a bill entitled the
Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971. This bill is the result of a
study made at the suggestion of then Chief Justice Earl Warren.
In proposing this study, Chief Justice Warren stated:
It is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional bal-
ance between the Federal and State court systems, assigning
to each system those cases most appropriate in light of the
basic principles of federalism.1
Establishing a principled division of jurisdiction between state
and federal courts was a problem with which the American Law
Institute2 struggled for 10 years. The result of their study is this
* United States Senator from North Dakota; Chairman, Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary; Member of
the North Dakota Bar. B.A., University of Minnesota, 1931; L.L.B., University of Min-
nesota, 1932.
** This author wishes to thank the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and the State Court Officials who furnished much of the information used in this study.
The author also wishes to thank John Olson, a third-year law student at the Uni-
versity of North Dakota and a summer intern, who conducted valuable research on spe-
cial problems regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
1. Speech to the American Law Institute, May 20, 1959.
2. The American Law Institute is a body of distinguished judges, members (lawyers
and legal scholars) of the bar, and law professors. They are responsible for the well
known Restatement of the Law, as well as such legislation as the MODEL PENAL CODE and
the UNInRM COMMERCIAL CODE.
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bill, a substantial revision of the chapters of title 28 of the United
States Code, which delineate the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts, the procedures for its invocation, and the limitations on its
exercise. The draft legislation and commentary explaining the rea-
sons for the changes were published in 1969.3
While we may not all agree on the fine points of this bill, those
who study it will share my appreciation of the scholarship, crafts-
manship, and objectivity of the Institute's work. As in all Institute
projects, their draft proposals were systematically reviewed by the
advisers and by the council at annual Institute meetings, a process
that made an enormous contribution to the shaping of the final
product.4
Before proceeding to the specific proposals of this bill it may be
helpful to briefly outline the development of the federal court system.
ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Judiciary Act of 17895 laid out the basic framework of our
judicial system. The jurisdiction presently vested in the federal
courts is the result of statutes enacted at various times in our history
with various specific purposes in mind.
The act of July 27, 1866 broadened removal in diversity cases-
about one-sixth of all diversity cases now come to the federal
bench by removal. The act of March 3, 18757 gave the lower fed-
eral courts, for the first time, jurisdiction in cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States-the "federal
question" jurisdiction, which accounted for 45 per cent of all civil
cases filed in federal courts last year.
These jurisdictional grants increased the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. To accommodate the increased work, the circuit courts
of appeals were created in 1891,8 and the "judges' bill" in 19259
made most review in the Supreme Court discretionary rather than
a matter of right.
In light of increasing caseloads of both federal and state courts
it is appropriate to examine the division of jurisdiction between the
state and federal courts.'
3. ALI, STUDY OF TEE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
(1969). Hereafter referred to as AIT STUDY.
4. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts. Tentative
Draft No. 1 (1963) ; Tentative Draft No. 2 (1964) ; Tentative Draft No. 3 (1965) ; Tenta-
tive Draft No. 4 (1966) ; Tentative Draft No. 5 (1967), and Tentative Draft No. 6 (1968).
There was also an Official Draft Part I (1965).
The discussion of the proposals is reported in 40-45 ALI PROCEEDINGS (1963-1968).
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 14.41 (1971).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1971).
8. 26 Stat. 826, ch. 517, 28 U.S.C. § 43 (1971).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1971).
10. In 1970, a total of 127,280 civil and criminal actions were commenced In the U.S.
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THE ALI PROPOSALS IN GENERAL
The conclusions of the ALI study, introduced as S. 1876, were pre-
sented in the form of a proposed revision of those sections of title
28 of the United States Code that now delineate the jurisdiction of
the district courts in six major areas: 1) diversity jurisdiction; 1' 2)
federal question jurisdiction;' 2 3) United States as a party; Is 4)
jurisdiction of three-judge courts; 14 5) admiralty and maritime jur-
isdiction;1 5 and 6) multiparty-multistate diversity. 16
It would be beneficial before proceeding to a discussion of diver-
sity jurisdiction to briefly summarize the changes in the present law
which would be made by the ALI recommendation in the other
major areas.
Outline of the ALl Proposals
I. Federal Question Jurisdiction. The bill would abolish the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount presently required and original actions
could be brought based upon the existence of a federally created
right, regardless of the amount in controversy. 7 The same rationale
would permit removal of a case from state to federal court, in cer-
tain cases, if a counterclaim based on a federal right is interposed. s
But where the federal right is asserted as a defense, removal could
not be had unless the amount in controversy met the $10,000 require-
ment. 9
II. United States as a Party. The bill makes certain technical
changes in this category of jurisdiction by clarifying the existing law
relating to counterclaims and set-offs which can be asserted in an
action brought by the United States. 20 It would increase from $10,000
to $50,000 the jurisdiction of the district courts in Tucker Act suits
based on contract claims against the United States.2 Jurisdiction is
further clarified as to any action brought against an officer or em-
ployee of the United States arising out of performance of his of-
ficial duties. 22
district courts, 13 percent more than fiscal year 1969. The 1970, increase in case filings
was the steepest caseload Jump for any year in the last decade. The caseload has grown
immensely in the last decade. On June 30, 1970, there were 114,117 civil and criminal
cases pending, 10 percent more than a year ago, and 66 percent greater than the 68,942
pending on June 30, 1960. The rise in state civil caseloads can be seen in Table 6.
11. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1301-1307 (1971) ; cf. generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,
1359, 1391, 1404, 1441 (1971).
12. Id. at §4 1311-1315; cf. generally 28 U.S.C. §8 1331, 1391, 1441 (1971).
13. Id. at 84 1321-1327; of. generally 28 U.S.C. 84 1345, 1346, 1349, 1357, 1361, 1406,
1442 (1971).
14. Id. at 84 1371-1376; cf. generally 28 U.S.C. 88 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284 (1971).
15. Id. at §§ 1316-1319; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1971).
16. Id. at §§ 2371-76; cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1971).
17. Id. at § 1331(a).
18. Id. at § 1312(a).
19. Id.
20. Id. at § 1321(b).
21. Id. at § 1322(a).
22. Id. at § 1823.
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III. Three-Judge Courts. The bill would limit the occasions when
a three-judge court would be required. None would be required if the
issue is the constitutionality of an act of Congress. 23 Three judges
would hear a case involving validity of a state statute, but only if
requested by the state official being sued.2 4 The circumstances when
a federal court should abstain from passing upon the constitution-
ality of state legislation or actions is clarified. 25
IV. Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
Jurisdiction in this area is not significantly changed. Rather, the
bill seeks to clarify existing statutory law and codify existing case
law in admiralty cases. The bill does, however, clarify the right to
a jury trial in admiralty cases [brought for] personal injuries or
death. 26
V. Multiparty-Multistate Litigation. It is proposed to extend the
jurisdiction of federal courts to cover those few situations where
necessary parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of any one
court, but are scattered in several states, and there exists diversity
of citizenship among adverse parties. 27
There is one other area covered by the ALI proposals which re-
mains the most controversial area of federal jurisdiction---diver-
sity jurisdiction.
The Rationale for Diversity Jurisdiction
The American Law Institute, after considerable study and de-
liberation, developed its jurisdictional proposals on the premise that,
generally, it is preferable to have matters of state law decided by
state courts and, correspondingly, matters of federal law by federal
courts. With respect to diversity jurisdiction, the Institute reached
the judgment that such jurisdiction should extend only to the pur-
poses intended by the framers of the Constitution and the Congress
that passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. That purpose was to provide
travelers and strangers access to a federal court and to insure an
even level of justice when outsiders were suing or being sued out-
side their home state. As stated by Charles Warren in his illuminat-
ing study of the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
The chief and only reason for this diverse citizenship juris-
diction was to afford a tribunal in which a foreigner or citi-
zen of another State might have the law administered free
from the local prejudices or passions which might prevail in
23. Id. at § 1374; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1971). It believed that the federal govern-
ment, unlike a state, should not be unduly embarrased by the ruling of a single federal
judge. When the federal government is the party, there Is no separate sovereign.
24. Id. at § 1874.
25. Id. at § 1371(c).
26. Id. at § 1319.
27. Id. at §§ 2871-2876.
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a State Court against foreigners or non-citizens. The Federal
Court was to secure a non-citizen the application of the same
law which a State Court would give to its own citizens, and
to see that within a state there should be no discrimination
against non-citizens in the application of justice . 2
Thus, the classic reason for the constitutional grant of diversity
jurisdiction was the protection of non-residents against local prej-
udice or the apprehension of such prejudice in the state courts.
THE ALI DIVERSITY PROPOSALS
If the rationale for diversity jurisdiction is to assure an even
level of justice to the traveler or visitor from another state, what
amendments are suggested to the present scheme of diversity juris-
diction? The Institute has concluded that when a person's involve-
ment with a state is such as to eliminate any real risk of prejudice
against him as a stranger and to make it unreasonable to heed any
objection he might make to the quality of its judicial system he
should remain in a state court and not have the option of a federal
forum.
The very heart of the present bill is the provision of section 1302
which would prevent a person from invoking diversity jurisdiction in
a federal court in his home state simply because his opponent hap-
pens to be an out-of-stater. 29 It is the most far-reaching in terms of
the number of cases involved. 0
On a similar basis, a corporation or other business enterprise with
a "local establishment" maintained for more than two years in a
state would be prohibited from invoking, either originally or on re-
moval, the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court in that state in
any action arising out of the activities of that establishment.2 1 Simi-
larly, a "commuter" provision would bar a natural person from ac-
cess to the federal court in the state where he had his principle
place of business or employment.82
These provisions are in line with the policy of the present statute,
regarding removal, which does not allow removal when the defend-
ant is a citizen of the state in which such action is brought.2 As
stated by one commentator:
This inconsistency between the treatment of an in-state
plaintiff and an in-state defendant cannot be explained on
any rational basis, even if we go back to the early days of
28. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federat Judiiarj Act of 1789, 37 -ABv.
L. R v. 49, 83 (1923).
29. S. 1876, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(a) (1971).
80. See Tables 1 and 2 infra.
31. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(b).
32. Id. at § 1302(c).
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the Republic. No one has yet devised any satisfactory ration-
ale as to why the Federal courts, conceived of as courts of
limited jurisdiction under the Constitution, should provide a
forum for local residents who, for some reason or another,
do not wish to sue in the courts of their own state.34
What this bill does is to treat resident plaintiffs the same way
resident defendants have always been treated-by denying them
original diversity jurisdiction in the federal court in their own state.
The policy goal with regard to commuters and corporations is
equal treatment with natural persons: when they are strongly es-
tablished in the state, their case as plaintiff or defendant can be
heard in state court without fear of local bias.
Other provisions are designed to reinforce the prohibition against
the artificial creation or destruction of diversity either by assignment
or the appointment of a fiduciary.3 5
Provisions Expanding Diversity Jurisdiction
Much attention in regard to the Institute's proposals have cen-
tered on those provisions reducing diversity jurisdiction. However, it
should not be overlooked that a number of important changes rec-
ognize the functional necessity in a particular case for granting to
a party the option of a federal hearing on his claim.
An important change in light of the number of cases involved
would allow an out-of-state defendant to remove an action to the fed-
eral court even though complete diversity is lacking because his co-
defendants are ineligible or unwilling to remove.86 This is a com-
mendable provision since a non-resident should not be barred from
the federal courts, which often happens under present law, 7 simply
because he is joined with a local defendant or any other defendant
who is unable or unwilling to remove. As an outsider there may be
potential bias towards him as against local defendants especially
with regard to the determination of joint and several liability.
Diversity jurisdiction is also extended by section 1301 (e) which
would cover a situation where one member of a family commences
a diversity action and other members of the family have claims
against the same defendant and arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence. These related claims can be joined in the same action
even though they are not sufficient to meet the requirement as to
amount in controversy.
A third expansion takes place under sections 2371-2376 which
would give the district courts nationwide jurisdiction over all dis-
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1971).
34. Testimony of Attorney Orison S. Marden in hearings on S. 1876 before the Senate
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, September 28, 1971.
35. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1307 and § 1301(b)(4).
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persed parties whose presence is necessary for a just adjudication
of the plaintiff's claim, but who are not all amenable to the process
of any one court, federal or state. This so-called "multiparty-multi-
state" diversity jurisdiction is a change required by our mobile so-
ciety and complex economy.
While the number of cases affected would be slight, further ex-
pansion results from provisions relating to citizenship of unincorpor-
ated associations 38 to removal based on a counterclaim asserted in
a state court action39 and a prohibition against use of an assignment
to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 40
EFFECT ON THE COURTS
Critics of the ALI proposal have suggested that its effect will be
to shift cases to congested state courts. This was a matter touched
on by Chief Justice Warren in his address, to the American Law In-
stitute, commencing this study. He cautioned that revision of juris-
diction should not be made without due regard for its effect upon
state courts.41 As chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee I share
this concern. Unless improvements are made in the administration
of justice in both the federal and state court systems, neither one
alone is likely to make any improvement in the problem we face in
achieving just, efficient and timely resolution of controversies
brought before our courts. The remaining portion of this article will
be directed to a study of the impact of S. 1876 upon our courts.
The Effect On Federal Courts
As I have stated, of particular concern to me is the effect of
this legislation upon the court systems of our respective states. How-
ever, it is first necessary to examine the effect of the diversity
provision of S. 1876 upon the federal district courts. For purposes
of illustration, Tables have been included within the text.
In making its proposal, the American Law Institute studied the
effect upon the federal court system for the years 1964 and 1968.
It reported that for fiscal year 1964 out of 20,174 total civil diversity
cases, 11,543 would have been shifted from federal courts to state
36. Id. at § 1304(b).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This section requires complete diversity of all parties and Is
apparently based on the belief that such a rule is required [Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)]. The Institute concluded that complete diversity was not
constitutionally required and this judgment was accepted by the Supreme Court [State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-531 (1967)].
38. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1301(b)(2).
39. Id. at § 1304(c).
40. Id. at § 1307.
4.1. Speech of Chief Justice Earl Warren to the American Law Institute, May 20, 1959.
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courts under these proposals. For fiscal year 1968, 12,367 out of 21,009
diversity cases would have been so affected.42
In fiscal year 1970, the United States district courts had a total
of 127,280 new case filings, both civil and criminal. Civil cases
amounted to 81,107 cases. Included in this total of civil cases were
22,854 cases in which the basis of federal jurisdiction was diversity
of citizenship.
Table 1 furnishes a breakdown of these diversity cases by resi-
dence of the party plaintiff and of the party defendant. In preparing
Table 1 certain basic assumptions were made: 1) In all cases involv-
ing non-resident corporations doing business in a state, "doing busi-
ness" is the equivalent of having "a local establishment" and that
these cases have arisen from the local activities of that organization"
and 2) No account is taken of the commuter provision. The effect of
the commuter provision will vary depending on the location of urban
centers within the state. Accurate data can be obtained only if docket
studies are conducted. Such a study was conducted in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania which encompasses Philadelphia, an area
of high commuter activity, and it showed that 7.6 per cent of all
original diversity cases in that district court would have been elim-
inated by the commuter proposal.4 4 A state which has a comparable
interstate commuter area would have a small, additional number of
cases transferred to its courts.
The 1970 data in Table 1 shows a total of 19,510 diversity actions
originally commenced in federal court and 3,344 removed from a
state court. The classes marked by the letter (a) in Table 1 rep-
resent cases brought originally by resident plaintiffs and those
brought or removed by a non-resident corporation doing business in
a state which would be shifted to state courts under S. 1876. They
total 14,109 cases, original and removed. These cases are assembled
for further analysis in Table 2.
TABLE 2
DIVERSITY CASES EXCLUDED FROM FEDERAL
JURISDICTION UNDER THE ALl PROPOSAL (1970)
Cases
Class of Parties Affected Shifted But Cases
By The ALI Proposal/a Removable/b Excluded Total
Resident Plaintiff Versus:
42. ALI STUDY, 466-468. Of these totals, 2,723 cases in 1964 and 3,365 cases in 1968,
although excluded from Federal Court as original actions, nevertheless would have been
removable to Federal Court by a non-resident defendant.
43. Factually, these two concepts may not be equivalents. See ALI STUDY 466. There-
fore, the actual number of "local establishment" cases transferred to the State Courts
under this provision will be somewhat less than indicated In the classes of cases involv-
ing corporate parties "doing business" as shown in Table 1.
44. See ALI STUDY 469-79.
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(1)/c Non res. corp. doing
business in state 7,676
(2) Non res. corp. not doing
business in state 1,046
(3) Other non resident 2,832
(16) Resident 119
Total 3,878 7,795 11,673
Non Resident Corporate Plaintiff Doing
Business in State Versus:
(4) Resident 1,867
(7) Non res. corp. doing
business in state 319
(8) Non res. corp. not doing
business in state 71
(9) Other non resident 99
Total 170 2,186 2,356
Cases Removed by Non Resident
Corporate Defendants Doing
Business in State Sued By
(10) Non res. corp. not doing
business in state 10
(11) Other non resident 70
80
Total 80
TOTAL ALL CASES 4,048 10,061 14,109
a/ This table, as all others in this paper, does not Include the effect of the com-
muter provisions, S. 1876, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. § 1302(c) (1971)-which would increase
the cases shifted. It also assumes that all cases Involving a corporation doing business
arise out of the activities of a local establishment which, by approximation, exceeds the
actual number of cases affected.
b/ Removed cases in classes (4), (5), (6), and (16)-involving removal by resident
defendants--are treated as not affected by the proposal. It can be assumed that removal
was requested by a properly joined non-resident defendant 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c) (1971).
See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1304(6) (1971) would both expand and clarify removal
in this situation.
c/ The numbers In parentheses refer to the party alignments shown In Table 1.
Table 2 shows that a maximum of 14,109 diversity cases would
be shifted from the federal courts to the state courts by the diver-
sity jurisdiction provisions of the ALI proposal. Of this total 11,673
are cases commenced by residents45 and 2,356 are cases commenced
by non-resident corporations doing business in a state.
While 14,109 is the maximum number of cases affected by S. 1876,
45. "Residents" include both individuals and domestic corporations because the sta-
tistical reports of the U.S. Courts do not differentiate between these types of residents.
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the actual number of cases which will be transferred to state courts
will be less. One should note from Table 2 that of the total cases,
only 10,061 are excluded from the jurisdiction of federal courts by
the bill. The other 4,048 cases are those brought by a resident (in-
dividual or corporate) against a non-resident (individual or corpor-
ation not having a "local establishment"). These cases will have to
be commenced in the state courts but they will be removable to
federal court under section 1304 of the ALI proposal, just as they
are removable under existing law. It seems likely that a large num-
ber of these 4,048 non-resident defendants will remove cases to the
federal courts. Thus, the actual number of cases shifted to state
courts will be somewhere between 10,000 and 14,000.
TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL COURT CIVIL CASELOAD (1970)
AND INCIDENCE BY STATES OF ALI PROPOSED
CHANGES IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTIONS
Total Civil
Cases
CommencedStates
Total
Diversity
Cases
Total Diversity
Cases Shifted
By S. 1876
Ist CIRCUIT
Maine 198 60 34
Massachusetts 1,617 350 264
N. Hampshire 148 93 40
Rhode Island 219 78 26
Puerto Rico 978 385 295
2nd CIRCUIT
Connecticut 720 193 83
New York 8,599 1,947 1,132
Vermont 333 261 107
3rd CIRCUIT
Delaware 192 66 19
New Jersey 1,687 555 255
Pennsylvania 5,891 2,078 1,368
4th CIRCUIT
Maryland 1,505 334 193
N. Carolina 1,188 337 193
S. Carolina 1,111 518 360
Virginia 2,639 718 442
W. Virginia 849 319 178
5th CIRCUIT
Alabama 1,817 774 529
Florida 3,880 621 328
Georgia 2,035 649 350
Louisiana 4,988 925 645
Mississippi 949 462 274
Texas 5,524 1,506 1,105
6th CIRCUIT
Kentucky 1,208 321
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Michigan
Ohio
Tennessee
2,537
2,519
1,816
7th CIRCUIT
Illinois 3,559 1,148 679
Indiana 1,618 940 523
Wisconsin 996 227 144
8th CIRCUIT
Arkansas 841 427 354
Iowa 479 202 132
Minnesota 921 363 190
Missouri 1,990 522 316
Nebraska 426 147 75
N. Dakota 129 47 29
S. Dakota 177 87 29
9th CIRCUIT
Alaska 247 60 45
Arizona 872 214 134
Californda 6,740 476 304
Hawaii 192 75 26
Idaho 225 70 36
Montana 275 102 52
Nevada 279 92 37
Oregon 799 285 202
Washington 1,090 194 170
10th CIRCUIT
Colorado 865 272 118
Kansas 954 299 164
New Mexico 484 184 110
Oklahoma 1,293 499 337
Utah 394 124 68
Wyoming 115 47 26
TOTAL 81,107 22,854 14,109
Table 3 tabulates and summarizes the overall civil workload of
the federal district courts, including the total civil cases commenced
(column 1), and the total diversity cases (column 2). It also shows
on a state-by-state basis the total number of diversity cases shifted
each state under these proposals (column 3).
It should be noted that the total civil cases commenced in the
federal district courts number 81,107 cases4 6 and that the total di-
versity cases number 22,854. The 14,109 diversity cases shifted under
this proposal would still leave the federal courts with 67,000 civil
cases without including any increase in jurisdiction which would
occur under the federal question, multiparty-multistate, family tort,
and removal provisions of the ALI proposal.
Since the figures in column 3 of Table 3, standing alone, are
46. This total omits figures for District of Columbia, Guam, Virgin Island and Canal
Zone.
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relatively insignificant, it is necessary to compare them to the work-
load now being borne by each state court system.
Effect On State Courts
The Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery re-
quested state authorities to furnish information regarding the civil
caseloads in their courts of general jurisdiction for the year 1970. At
the time this article went to press, 33 states had responded, 30 of
which furnished the appropriate information. A comparison of the
diversity cases shifted under the ALI proposal to the total number
of civil cases commenced in each of these 30 states is shown in
Table 4. As might be expected the number of diversity cases which
would be shifted, in all states except one, varied between 0.27 to
1.5 per cent of the total civil filings.
47
TABLE 4
DIVERSITY CASES SHIFTED COMPARED TO
TOTAL NUMBER OF STATE CIVIL CASES
Shifted Diversity
Total No. No. of Cases Compared
of State Diversity To Total No.
Civil Cases of State Civil
States Cases Shifted Cases (%)
1st CIRCUIT
Maine 34
Massachusetts 41,047 264 0.6
New Hampshire 12,741 40 0.3
Rhode Island 5,130 26 0.5
Puerto Rico 295
2nd CIRCUIT
Connecticut 19,399 83 0.4
New York 75,809 1,132 1.5
Vermont 107
3rd CIRCUIT
Delaware 4,203 19 0.5
New Jersey 35,777 255 0.71
Pennsylvania 25,707 1368 (780)* 3.0*
4th CIRCUIT
Maryland 53,667 193 0.27
47. Pennsylvania reported only 25,707 civil cases as compared to a substantially larger
volume for such States as Ohio and Michigan, for example. Apparently the Pennsylvania
statistical system reports cases when they are filed at the time of commencement of
the action. In order to offer some basis of comparison between Pennsylvania and Federal
statistics, it must be noted that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that
in the nation as a whole 43% of all diversity cases are terminated without court action.
If this same percentage is applied to the 1,368 cases shown in Table 3 as being shifted
to Pennsylvania, 588 of those cases would be terminated without court action. Thus, the
remaining 780 cases would be an approximation of the number of Federal cases shifted
which would reach the "ready for trial" stage which is the Pennsylvania criteria for
inclusion in its statistical system,
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
N. Carolina
S. Carolina
Virginia
W. Virginia
13,589
49,276
1.4
0.9
**
5th CIRCUIT
Alabama 539
Florida 94,411 328 0.3
Georgia 350
Louisiana 108,749 645 0.6
Mississippi 274
Texas 200,992 1,105 0.6
6th CIRCUIT
Kentucky 185
Michigan 86,893 496 0.8
Ohio 50,060 517 1.0
Tennessee 63,505 390 0.6
7th CIRCUIT
Illinois 679
Indiana 523
Wisconsin 144
8th CIRCUIT
Arkansas 29,531 354 1.2
Iowa 37,965 132 0.35
Minnesota 16,924 190 1.1
Missouri 71,166 316 0.45
Nebraska 75
N. Dakota 4,973 29 0.65
S. Dakota 5,938 29 0.5
9th CIRCUIT
Alaska 45
Arizona 134
California 103,749 304 0.3
Hawaii 4,335 26 0.6
Idaho 36
Montana ** 52 **
Nevada 737
Oregon 29,853 202 0.7
Washington 35,212 170
10th CIRCUIT
Colorado 17,717 118 0.6
Kansas 29,826 164 0.5
New Mexico 21,501 110 0.5
Oklahoma 337
Utah 68
Wyoming ** 26 **
Looking at one of the states by way of example, in Massachu-
setts, 264 cases would be transferred to the state courts compared
to 41,047 cases filed in the courts of general jurisdiction of Massa-
* Supra note 47 and related text.
* These states do not report cases filed.
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chusetts in 1970. Thus the cases transferred constitute only 0.6 per
cent of the present state civil caseload in Massachusetts.
To further evaluate these proposals a determination -was made
of the average number of cases shifted to each state in relation to
the number of judges in that state's court of general jurisdiction. As
shown in Table 5 the transfer of this maximum number of diversity
cases would impose an additional number of cases varying between
0.8 and 7.4 cases per judge in all states except Vermont and South
Carolina.4 8
TABLE 5
NUMBER OF DIVERSITY CASES SHIFTED
PER STATE TRIAL JUDGE
Number of Diversity
State Trial Diversity Cases Civil
Judges Cases Shifted Per Terminations
General Shifted State Trial Per State Trial
States Jurisdiction (1970 Data) Judge (Avg.) Judge (Avg.)
1st CIRCUIT
Maine 11 34 3.1
Massachusetts 46 264 5.7 858
New ',Hampshire 10 40 4.0 1,268
Rhode Island 13 26 2.0 -
2nd CIRCUIT
Puerto Rico 70 295 4.2 -
Connecticut 35 83 2.4 508
New York 225 1,132 5.0 336
Vermont 6 107 18.8/a -
4,8. In Vermont there are 6 Judges in the-county courts, the courts of general' juris-
diction. There are 10 judges in the district courts. VT. STAT. ANN. § 444(a) (Supp.
1971). They have Jurisdiction in civil cases for amounts up to $5,000.
Thus when the 107 shifted cases are compared with the total number of Judges in
the State courts of major jurisdiction, the average number of cases shifted per Judge is
6.7, a figure comparable with many other states.
It is of course true that since a claim for over $10,000 must be made in all diver-
sity cases they will apparently all go to the county courts. However a study of diver-
sity cases in New York City, both settled and going to judgment, shows they" do not all
have high values. A substantial number of these cases are settled or reached Judgment
for less than $10,000, many for under $5,000.
THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF
NEw YORK, COURT AND MONETARY BREAKDOWN Os' CLOSING STATEMENT 292 (1970).
In South Carolina there are 16 Circuit Court Judges in the trial courts of general
jurisdiction. However, South Carolina has a very well developed system of county courts
of limited jurisdiction, with substantial jurisdictional limits.
These county courts have jurisdiction in law and equity up to the amount shown:
Anderson-$12,500-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-631.11 (Supp. 1970).
Greenville-$10,000-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-654 (1962).
Marlboro-$7,500--S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-696 (1962).
Orangeburg-$10 ,000-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-714.(1962).
Richland (2 judges)-$10,000-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-764 (1962).
Spartanburg-$6,000-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-804 (1962).
So we .have expressed a comparison of the cases" shifted to the major state trial couits
(16 circuit plus these 8; county judges). However, it is recognized that since in all diver-
sity cases a claim of over $10,000 must be made most of the shifted cases would go to
the circuit courts. Therefore it would be necessary in South Carolina to increase the
jurisdictional limit of the county courts or appoint additional circuit court judges or a
combination of both.
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3rd CIRCUIT
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
19
255
1368 (780)*
403
427
4th CIRCUIT
Maryland 79 193 2.5 635
N. Carolina 49 193 4.0 317
S. Carolina 16 360 22.5/a
Virginia 99 442 4.5 458
W. Virginia 32 178 5.5 /b
5th CIRCUIT
Alabama 80 539 6.7
Florida 144 328 2.3 655
Georgia 52 350 6.7
Louisiana 94 645 6.9 858
Mississippi 49 274 5.6
Texas 211 1,105 5.3 927
6th CIRCUIT
Kentucky 73 185 2.5
Michigan 116 496 3.9 730
Ohio 181 517 2.9 249
Tennessee 78 390 5.0 751
7th CIRCUIT
Illinois 360 679 1.9
Indiana 186 523 3.9
Wisconsin 174 144 0.8
8th CIRCUIT
Arkansas 48 354 7.4 593
Iowa 76 132 1.7 469
Minnesota 68 190 2.7 244
Missouri 102 316 3.1 628
Nebraska 38 75 2.0
N. Dakota 19 29 1.5 247
S. Dakota 21 29 1.4 193
9th CIRCUIT
Alaska 11 45 4.1 -
Arizona 51 134 3.8 -
California 416 304 0.7 180
Hawaii 14 26 1.5 217
Idaho 24 36 2.0
Montana 28 52 1.5 /b
Nevada 18 37 2.0
Oregon 59 202 3.4 467
Washington 88 170 1.9
10th CIRCUIT
Colorado 74 118 1.6 266
Kansas 61. 164 2.7 485
New Mexico 21 110 5.2 974
Oklahoma 138 337 2.5
Utah 22 68 3.1
Wyoming 11 26 2.4 /b
* Supra note 47 and related text.
a/ Supra note 48 and related text.
b/ These states do not record civil terminations.
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Column 4 of Table 5 shows the average number of civil termi-
nations per judge in the 30 states. This figure can then be compared
to the number of diversity cases shifted per judge. As can be seen,
in most states the number of diversity cases shifted per trial judge
ranges between approximately two and seven. While the number of
terminations per state trial judge ranges for the most part between
about 250 and 800. Therefore, the effect of this bill would only
slightly increase the number of cases per state trial judge. And of
course, most of these shifted cases would be settled without trial.4 9
An example will illustrate the point. In Massachusetts the num-
ber of diversity cases shifted per state trial judge is 5.7 while the
average number of civil terminations per state trial judge is 858.
Table 6 shows the number of diversity cases shifted to state
courts compared to the annual increase in state civil' litigation. It
includes those states from which comparisons between 1969 and 1970
civil filings were available. This table demonstrates that the shift in
diversity cases is not large in comparison to the annual fluctuation
in state civil litigation.
In all states with an increase in civil litigation during 1970, the
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF DIVERSITY CASES SHIFTED UNDER S.1876 TO THE
INCREASE IN CIVIL CASES COMMENCED: SELECTED STATES
Change in
Civil Civil Civil Case Fil-
Cases Cases Diversity ings Comp.
Filled Filed In- Cases to Div. Cases
'69 '70 crease Shifted Shifted-%
California 97,997 103,749 5,752 304 5.3%
Connecticut 17,565 19,399 1,834 83 4.5%
Kansas 25,995/a 28,737/a 2,742 164 5.6%
Louisiana 99,139 105,439 6,300 645 10%
Maryland 50,384 53,667 3,283 193 6%
Massachussetts 41,736 41,047 -689 264 38.5%/b
Michigan 82,292 86,893 4,601 496 11%
Minnesota 15,533 16,924 1,391 190 13.5%
Missouri 59,037 71,166 12,129 316 2.6%
New Jersey 34,341 33,892 -449 255 57%/b
New York 69,783 75,809 6,026 1,132 19%
North Carolina 11,880 13,589 1,709 193 11.3%
North Dakota 4,344 4,973 629 29 4.6%
Oregon 17,401 19,682 2,281 202 9%
South Dakota 5,341 5,939 597 29 4.9%
Washington 57,423 60,569 3,146 170 5.4%
a/ The case filings for Kansas are from 1970 and 1971 respectively.
b/ In Massachusetts and New Jersey civil case filings were less in 1970 than 1969.
However, lihe cases shifted are substantially fewer than the decrease in state cases so
that a net reduction of the state caseload would still occur.
49. Over 83% of all diversity cases are concluded prior to trial (See Annual Report
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table C4, at 245(b)
(1970).
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number of diversity cases shifted were but a small fraction of that
increase. In New York, where 1,100 cases would be shifted by the
ALI proposal, these shifted cases were only 19 per cent of the 6,000
increase in civil filings. In all other states shown in Table 6 the
diversity cases shifted were less than 11 per cent of the 1970 in-
crease in civil filings.
Massachusetts and New Jersey showed a decrease in civil liti-
gation between 1969 and 1970. Yet even in these two states, the de-
crease in state civil litigation was considerably larger than the num-
ber of diversity cases which would be shifted to the state courts.
Of particular interest to the readers of this article will be a sum-
mary of the information in the tables as it relates to the States of
North Dakota and Minnesota.
North Dakota
In 1970, there were 4,973 civil cases filed in the district courts
of North Dakota, as against a maximum of 29 diversity cases com-
menced in or removed to the United States District Court which
would be transferred under this proposal (0.5 per cent). Of those 29
cases, three would remain removable to the federal courts, leaving
a potential shift of only 26 cases. The maximum shift (29 cases) is
only 4.6 per cent of the annual civil case increase (1969-70) in
North Dakota.
There were 4,688 cases terminated in North Dakota in 1970. Since
there are 19 district judges, the average number. of terminations of
a district judge is 247 cases. If the shifted cases were spread among
the 19 judges, they would add 1.5 cases per judge or about 0.6 per
cent of their average caseload.
Thus, the adoption of the present proposals would not, it appears,
markedly affect the caseload of the North Dakota state courts or of
its judges.
Minnesota
In the fiscal year 1970, there were 16,924 civil cases commenced
in the district courts of Minnesota, the state courts of general jur-
isdiction, as against a maximum of 190 diversity cases brought in or
removed to the United States District Court which would be trans-
ferred under this proposal (1.1 per cent). Of those 190 cases, approx-
imately 70 would remain removable to the federal courts. If we as-
sume that about half of these cases would be removed, then the
actual shift of diversity cases would be between 150-160 cases. The
maximum shift (190 cases) is 13.7 per cent (190/1391) of the annual
civil case increase (1969-70) in Minnesota.
There were 16,576 civil cases terminated in Minnesota in 1970.
Since there are 68 judges (excluding juvenile judges) in courts of
general jurisdiction, the average number of civil terminations of a
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district judge is 244 cases. If the shifted cases were spread among
the 68 judges, they would add 2.73 cases per judge, or about 1 per
cent of their average caseload.
Thus, the adoption of the present proposals would not, it appears,
markedly affect the caseload of the Minnesota state courts.
Conclusion
My goal has been to furnish to the bar a concise explanation of
the American Law Institute's recommended changes in the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts, to summarize and explain the Institute's rea-
sons for its diversity recommendations, and to demonstrate what im-
pact these changes will have upon the state court systems.
This article is not to be taken as an indication of what final
action will be taken by the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery. Nor should one conclude that this article nec-
essarily indicates my final judgment on S. 1876. The caseload study
reported herein represents only one of many studies which will be
made of this bill. In late September 1971, hearings were commenced
on the bill. Only after these hearings have been concluded sometime
in 1972 will any member of the Subcommittee be in a position to
make a final evaluation of the merits of the bill.
However, it seems clear that a final evaluation should not be
based merely upon the numerical effect of the bill upon the caseload
of either the federal or the state courts. From time to time because
of the important national needs, Congress has passed various legis-
lative programs dealing with many problems traditionally handled by
the states. For example, under the Dyer Act, 50 4,090 cases were
handled in the federal courts in 1970. 51 Recently, Congress passed
the Narcotics Rehabilitation Act 52 which brought 2,011 cases into the
federal courts in 1969 and 3,268 cases in 1970. 5 3 There were 3,511
narcotics cases, including over 2,000 marijuana cases tried in the
federal courts in 1970, and in addition, over 1,000 cases of bank rob-
bery.54 Altogether these cases total almost 12,000, very nearly the
amount of cases which would be transferred to the state courts under
S. 1876.
The responsibility of Congress in finally passing upon S. 1876
is to assess the need for a revision of the division of jurisdiction be-
tween state and federal courts. In final analysis, if the need is
found to exist and if the revision is, in fact, a principled one which
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1971).
51. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Table D2, at 267 (1970).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1971).
53. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Table 14, at 109 (1970).
54. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Table D2, at 267, 268 (1970).
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will help to preserve and strengthen the dual system of courts in
this country, then the American Law Institute's proposal may finally
be enacted by Congress.

